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Is There a Concept of Experimental Error in Greek 
Astronomy? 
GIORA HON 
The attempt to narrow the general discourse of the problem of error and to focus it on 
the specific problem of experimental error may be approached from different directions. 
One possibility is to establish a focusing process from the standpoint of history; such an 
approach requires a careful scrutiny of the history of science with a view to identifying 
the juncture when the problem of experimental error was properly understood and 
accounted for. In a study of this kind one would have to examine the evolution of the 
method of experimentation and related topics so that clear criteria would underlie the 
analysis. 
This is not what I propose to do, if only for the reason that one cannot do justice to 
an historical study of this kind in a single paper. Rather, I propose to bring the problem 
of experimental error to the fore by contrasting two different attitudes towards it. I have 
addressed myself elsewhere to the question as to why it was not permissible for Kepler to 
ignore a discrepancy of eight minutes of arc; eight minutes which, in Kepler's words, 'led 
the way to the reformation of the whole of astronomy'.' In contrast to Kepler's percep- 
tion, I shall discuss in the present paper a few suggestive cases from Greek astronomy in 
which such an awareness of error is at best only implicit or indeed lacking altogether. I 
shall attempt further to set this contrast against a philosophical and methodological 
background so that the essential elements which are conducive to the understanding of 
the problem of experimental error will be at hand. My principal argument is that in a 
science where empirical results are used more often for the purpose of illustrating and 
supporting theories rather than testing them, one would not expect a clear grasp of the 
concept of experimental error. 
In a famous passage in the Republic, Plato (428-348 B.C.) expresses a view which 
prima facie amounts to a categorical objection to the observational method, and by 
implication to the method of experimentation. Notwithstanding his acceptance of the 
view that 'the stars that decorate the sky . .. [are] the finest and most perfect of visible 
1 'Nunc quia contemr non potuerunt, sola igitur haec octo minuta viam praeiverunt ad totam 
Astronomiam reformandam, suntque materia magnae parti hujus operis facta.' Quoted by Koyre. (A. Koyre, 
The Astronomical Revolution: Copernicus-Kepler-Borelli, (tr. R.E.W. Maddison), London, 1973, p. 401, 
note no. 22.) See G. Hon, 'On Kepler's Awareness of the Problem of Experimental Error', Annals of Science 
(1987), 44, pp. 545-591. 
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130 G. Hon 
things', they are, Plato maintains, 'far inferior, just because they are visible, to the pure 
realities'.2 For Plato it is the true relative velocities, in pure numbers and perfect figures, 
of the planets and their orbits, which constitute realities; and these are perceptible, in his 
view, to reason and thought but not visible to the eye.3 He therefore argues that 'if anyone 
tries to learn anything about the world of sense whether by gaping upwards or blinking 
downwards, I don't reckon that he really learns-there is no knowledge to be had of such 
things'.4 Astronomy should be treated, according to Plato, like geometry; that is, a disci- 
pline which sets problems for solution.S Thus, in order to make a genuine study of this 
subject, one should ignore the visible heavens.6 Plato indeed applies this principle further 
and comments that the Pythagoreans are 'wasting their time on measuring audible con- 
cords and notes against each other'.7 He does not think much of these people who 'tor- 
ment the strings and try to wring the truth out of them by twisting them on pegs'.8 He 
seems to despise the attempt to 'look for numerical relationships in audible concords'.9 
In sum, concerning both astronomy and harmonics, Plato appears, in these passages of 
the Republic, to object to the preference of the senses over mind. 
However, as F.M. Cornford points out, 'Plato's primary purpose here is not to 
advance physical science, but to train the mind to think abstractly'.10 In this sense, 
astronomy should be considered a study which can make the Guardians cultivate reason 
rather than the senses.1" Nevertheless, Plato's didactic injunction to ignore the visible 
heavens was taken out of context in antiquity, as it has been again in modern times, to 
be construed as a ban on observational methods as a whole. 12 It appears that this doctrine 
of Plato has had a great influence upon the interpretation of Greek sciences. But as 0. 
Neugebauer argues, 
if modern scholars had devoted as much attention to Galen or Ptolemy as they did to Plato and 
his followers, they would have come to quite different results and they would not have invented 
the myth about the remarkable quality of the so-called Greek mind to develop scientific theories 
without resorting to experimental or empirical tests. 13 
2 Plato, Republic, 2nd edn, rev. (tr. with an introduction D. Lee), London, 1974, p. 338 (529d). 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid., (529b-c), emphasis in translation. 
5 Ibid., p. 339 (530b). 
6 Ibid., (530b-c). 
7 Ibid., p. 340 (531). 
8 Ibid., (531b). 
9 Ibid., p. 342 (53 1c). 
10 F.M. Cornford, The Republic of Plato, Oxford, 1966, p. 241. 
11 G.E.R. Lloyd, Magic, Reason and Experience, Cambridge, 1979, p. 132. 
12 Ibid., p. 133. For detailed studies of this issue see G.E.R. Lloyd, 'Plato as a Natural Scientist', Journal 
of Hellenic Studies (1968), 88, pp. 78-8 1; A.P.D. Mourelatos, 'Plato's "Real Astronomy": Republic 527D- 
53 1D', in J.P. Anton (ed.) Science and the Sciences In Plato, with an Introduction by J.P. Anton, New York, 
1980, pp. 33-73; I. Mueller, 'Ascending to Problems: Astronomy and Harmonics in Republic VII', in Anton, 
ibid., pp. 103-122; and G. Vlastos, 'The Role of Observation in Plato's Conception of Astronomy', in Anton, 
ibid., pp. 1-3 1. I am grateful to G.E.R. Lloyd for bringing the last three articles to my attention. 
13 0. Neugebauer, The Exact Sciences of Antiquity, 2nd edn, New York, 1969, p. 152; see also p. 69. 
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In Neugebauer's view, 
it is not because of philosophical prejudices that the Ptolemaic system dominated astronomy 
for about 1500 years but because of the solidity of its empirical foundations.'4 
Indeed, as G. E. R. Lloyd has convincingly demonstrated,15 the notion that Plato 
steered Greek sciences away from empirical grounds, cannot be sustained by a careful 
study. It is now established that Greek sciences included many observational results- 
obtained either directly or through experimentation-which were incorporated into 
theories. However, a crucial question arises as to the way observational results were 
incorporated: were they considered a critical means of testing theories, or a mere cor- 
roborative device for the purpose of persuasion; a device over which theories could take 
precedence? 
From the point of view of the problem of experimental error, this question is all the 
more important since its answer can afford a clue to the understanding of the limited 
awareness the Greeks had of the problem of experimental error. The following suggestive 
cases from the history of Greek astronomy indicate that the answer is the latter; namely, 
that the context in which observational results were incorporated into theories, at least 
in Greek astronomy, was not that of testing but rather corroborating. Hence the con- 
clusion that the Greek astronomers had at best only an implicit awareness of the concept 
of experimental error; an awareness which never developed into explicit methodological 
procedures designed to account for the occurrences of experimental errors. 
According to Neugebauer, Aristarchus (310-230 B.C.) can be considered the first 
astronomer who demonstrated that out of a few observational data combined with 
purely mathematical arguments, one could glean information about the sizes of the 
moon, the sun and their distances from earth. Aristarchus thus established a new 
methodological principle which is based on empirical and rational arguments.16 Yet, 
much of his astronomy shows, as Neugebauer puts it, 'a lack of interest in empirical 
numerical data in contrast to the emphasis on the purely mathematical structure'.17 
In his only preserved treatise, On the Sizes and Distances of the Sun and Moon,18 
Aristarchus deduced the result that the distance of the sun from earth is between eighteen 
and twenty times as great as that of the moon from earth. This result, which prima facie 
indicates a certain awareness of what a physical measurement consists of, namely, that 
it gives upper and lower bounds, was arrived at through correct geometrical, and thus 
theoretical, considerations but on the basis of an impracticable observational method. As 
a consequence, this result involved incorrect magnitudes of astronomical parameters. 
14 0. Neugebauer, 'Notes on Hipparchus', in S.S. Weinberg (ed.), The Aegean and the Near East, New 
York, 1956, p. 296. See also 0. Neugebauer, Astronomy and History, Selected Essays, New York, 1983. 
Quoted by R. Palter, 'An Approach to the History of Early Astronomy', Studies in History and Philosophy of 
Science (1970), 1, p. 127 note no. 3. However, see op. cit. (49). 
15 Lloyd, op. cit. (11). 
16 0. Neugebauer, A History of Ancient Mathematical Astronomy, Studies in the History of Mathematics 
and Physical Sciences, (eds M.J. Klein and G.J. Toomer), No. 1, 3 vols, Berlin and New York, p. 659. 
17 Ibid., p. 271. 
18 T. Heath, Aristarchus of Samos, the ancient Copernicus (A history of Greek astronomy to Aristarchus 
together with Aristarchus' treatise on the sizes and distances of the sun and moon), Oxford, 1913. 
132 G. Hon 
Furthermore, according to Aristarchus' geometrical construction, the ratios of the 
sizes and distances which he set himself to calculate are trigonometrical. In Aristarchus' 
time such ratios had not been calculated, nor had a reasonably close approximation to 
the value of ir been obtained. Being unable to perform exact calculations, Aristarchus 
apparently resolved to locate the sought ratios within upper and lower bounds.19 
Specifically, his combined observations and calculations yielded the result: 
18Rm < Rs < 2ORm, which is in fact a direct consequence of the inequalities, 
1/20 < cos87? < 1/18. These inequalities are indeed correct, but the upper and lower 
bounds are obviously of mathematical origin and do not therefore reflect any physical 
consideration.20 
Theoretically, the problem Aristarchus attempted to solve is quite simple once the 
construction of a right triangle, EMS, has been justified. 
m~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
E R 
/ som~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
The problem comprises the solution of this triangle, in particular the ratio Rm/Rs = coso. 
If one were to calculate, as indeed Aristarchus did, that C2 < cosoL < C1, where C1 
and C2 are constant, then one would get the result, CiRm < Rs < C2Rm.21 
In contrast to the theoretical simplicity of this problem, the practical difficulties are 
enormous. The measurement of the elongation ot at the moment of dichotomy-that is, 
the moment when the moon is half illuminated-is fundamental to this determination. 
However, as Neugebauer categorically states, such a measurement 'is totally impractic- 
able'.22 Since the elongation of the moon changes one degree in about two hours, it is 
desirable to establish the moment of dichotomy within at least one hour. However, one 
would consider oneself lucky to determine the night in which dichotomy occurs. In fact, 
it seems that the magnitude Aristarchus assigned to the elongation cx, that is eighty-seven 
degrees, is completely fictitious (that angle is thought to be 890 51').23 
19 Ibid., p. 328. 
20 Ibid., pp. 333-334. 
21 Ibid. Cf. Neugebauer, op. cit. (16), pp. 634-643. 
22 Neugebauer, ibid., p. 642. 
23 Ibid. Boyer describes Aristarchus' method as unimpeachable;'the result,' he writes, 'being vitiated only 
by the error of observation in measuring the angle MES as 87 degrees.' (C.B. Boyer, A History of Mathematics, 
New York, 1968, p. 177.) By disregarding the enormous practical difficulty which the measurement of angle 
MES involves, Boyer misses a crucial element of this method of Aristarchus, namely, that for all intents and pur- 
poses, Aristarchus' measurement is a mathematical exercise. Cf., G.E.R. Lloyd, 'Observational Error in Later 
Greek Science', in J. Barnes et al. (eds) Science and Speculation, Studies in Hellenistic Theory and Practice, 
Cambridge, 1982, p. 153. 
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Moreover, it seems unlikely that the apparent diameter of the moon-a parameter 
which Aristarchus had to introduce in order to obtain the distances in terms of earth 
radii-was the result of a direct measurement. One may speculate that any attempt to 
measure it would have given Aristarchus a better estimate than the two degrees which he 
used. In fact, it appears that Aristarchus himself knew that two degrees is a gross over- 
estimate; for Archimedes (286-212 B.C.) reports in his treatise the Sand-Reckoner, that 
'Aristarchus discovered that the sun's apparent size is about one 720th part of the zodiac 
circle',24 that is half a degree. As one of the physical assumptions in Aristarchus' calcula- 
tion is that the moon and the sun are of equal apparent diameter, it seems strange that he 
did not use that value in his calculations, or amend them in the light of his new 
observational result. 
However, there would be no surprise if one were to view Aristarchus' measurements 
as a purely mathematical exercise. 'If Aristarchus chose for the apparent diameter of the 
sun a value which he knew to be false, it is clear,' Tannery commented in 1883 that this 
treatise was mainly intended to give a specimen of calculations which require to be made on the 
basis of more exact experimental observations, and to show at the same time that, for the 
solution of the problem, one of the data could be chosen almost arbitrarily. He secured himself 
in this way against certain objections which might have been raised.25 
Tannery seems to suggest that Aristarchus, being dissatisfied with the quality of the 
physical parameters, proceeded to illustrate his method with an arbitrary numerical 
value for the apparent diameter of the sun. 
Whether or not Aristarchus envisaged much more exact observations and thus, by 
implication, knew the importance of securing accurate astronomical parameters, cannot 
be historically established. However, as Neugebauer holds, it is certainly the case that 
Aristarchus' 'measurement' of the sizes and distances of the sun and the moon 'has as 
little to do with practical astronomy as Archimedes' Sand-Reckoner in which he 
demonstrates the capability of mathematics of giving numerically definite estimates even 
for such questions as the ratio of the volume of the universe to the volume of a grain of 
sand'.26 In his treatise, Aristarchus appears to assume numerical data which are, in 
Neugebauer's words, 'nothing but arithmetically convenient parameters, chosen without 
any consideration for observational facts', and he proceeds to elaborate a pedantic 
mathematical formulation which is 'unrelated to the complexities of empirical data'.27 
Aristarchus, in other words, treats astronomy as a field of study which, like geometry, 
sets problems to be solved; the hallmark of Plato cannot here be ignored. 
Although Archimedes develops in his Sand-Reckoner, like Aristarchus before him, a 
pedantic and rigorous mathematical demonstration while ignoring the practical signifi- 
cance of the problem, he does introduce some practical innovations which indicate a cer- 
tain concern with physical and technical aspects. However, this new perspective does not 
in itself indicate a substantial divergence from the trend of early Greek astronomy to 
which Aristarchus' method belongs. 
24 Heath, op. cit. (18), p. 311. 
25 Quoted by Heath, ibid., pp. 311-312. 
26 Neugebauer, op. cit. (16), p. 643. 
27 Ibid. 
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According to Archimedes' formulation in the Sand-Reckoner, the problem of estab- 
lishing the volume of the universe requires one physical parameter which has to be 
secured through observation; this is the apparent solar diameter. To measure this 
parameter Archimedes contrived a dioptra of which he gave only a sketchy description. 
It operates with a small vertical cylinder which can be moved on a horizontal ruler into 
a position which covers exactly the solar disk at sunrise. In addition, he experimented 
with two very small cylinders in order to determine the width of the observer's pupil.28 
Thus, it appears that Archimedes was not satisfied with the traditional geometrical 
optics, and tried to combine it with a result from physiological optics. As Neugebauer 
explains, 
the apparent diameter of the sun is ... measured as the angle between two tangents to the first 
mentioned cylinder and the little space which corresponds to the width of the pupil determined 
in the second experiment.29 
Archimedes discloses that in his own attempts to determine by means of instruments 
the angle subtended by the sun, he realized that 
this angle is not easy to determine precisely because neither eyes nor hands nor the instruments 
necessary for the determination are sufficiently free from error to render it exact. But as this 
point has been frequently made, it is hardly appropriate to discuss it further at this time.30 
However, neither Archimedes' writings nor any other early work which has been pre- 
served bear this point out. The question as to whether this revealing remark concerning 
actual practice was so common a point as not to be worth pursuing in the above context, 
should therefore remain open. 
Archimedes found that the angle subtended by the sun's diameter is between 1/1 64th 
and 1/200th part of a right angle.3' On the basis of this result he proves that the diameter 
of the sun is greater than the side of a chiliagon (a regular polygon with 1000 sides) 
inscribed in its orbit. In this proof Archimedes abandons the traditional view that the 
earth is a point in relation to the sphere in which the sun moves (Aristarchus regarded the 
earth as a point even with respect to the sphere in which the moon moves); he thereby 
demonstrates his awareness of the phenomenon of parallax in the case of the sun.32 
However, these careful and subtle considerations stand in stark contrast to 
Archimedes' employment of crude roundings which are perfectly justified in view of his 
sole objective: to obtain a secure upper bound for the volume of the universe. For 
instance, he multiplies the commonly accepted circumference of the earth by a factor of 
ten; he also more than doubles the diameter of the sun in relation to the diameter of the 
moon, and he replaces a regular polygon of 812 sides by a 1000-gon.33 
28 Ibid., p. 647. Cf., Lloyd, op. cit. (23), p. 136. 
29 Neugebauer, ibid. 
30 Quoted by Palter, op. cit. (14), p. 121. 
31 Neugebauer, op. cit. (16), p. 644. 
32 Heath, op. cit. (18), p. 348. Heath suggests that Archimedes was the first to recognize the phenomenon 
of parallax with respect to the sun. (Ibid.) Neugebauer, on his part, maintains that we do not know who intro- 
duced the concept of parallax into Greek astronomy. (Neugebauer, op. cit. (16), p. 322.) 
33 Neugebauer, ibid., p. 644. 
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'And yet', as Neugebauer remarks, Archimedes 'undertakes a rigorous geometric dis- 
cussion about the change of an angle observed from the earth's surface when shifted to 
the center of the earth,'34 not to mention the measurement of the width of the observer's 
pupil. To amplify the accuracy of only some parts of the calculation which is, as a whole, 
based on crude roundings, does not render the calculation more accurate. On the con- 
trary, it shows a lack of insight into the relationship between the abstract power of 
mathematics and the practice of physics. The width of the observer's pupil and the 
phenomenon of parallax are, from the standpoint of the degree of accuracy demanded by 
the problem, simply irrelevant o Archimedes' result that the volume of the universe con- 
tains less than 1051 grains of sand.35 This kind of excessive rigour is essentially erroneous. 
It may be called erroneous rigour; a practice by no means rare at the present time. 
A new insight into the interplay between theory and practice, between mathematics 
and physics, and, moreover, a recognition of the limitation of knowledge and its pitfalls, 
are displayed in the work of Hipparchus (190-125 B.C.). 
In his attempt to determine the distances of the sun and the moon, Hipparchus distin- 
guished, it seems for the first time, between the theoretical and the practical aspect of the 
phenomenon of parallax. From the theoretical point of view, the problem of parallax is 
very simple and straightforward: if ,B is the zenith distance of P, a celestial object, with 
reference to the point E, the centre of the earth, an observer in 0 will find a zenith distance 
,3' > ,B. The difference p = ,3'-vP is the parallax of P. 
0 
/3 _
E 
The phenomenon of parallax is intimately related to the problem of determining the 
distances of celestial objects; for if P and p were known one could compute the ratio of 
EO = re and EP; in other words, one could find the geocentric distance of P measured in 
earth radii. However, the practical aspect of this phenomenon, that is, the measurement 
of p, is anything but straightforward: with p so small, errors of observation were bound 
to prevail given the observational techniques available in antiquity.36 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid., p. 646. Cf., Lloyd, op. cit. (23), pp. 153-155. 
36 Neugebauer, ibid., pp. 100, 1235, Fig. 92. 
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I suggest that the comprehension of this distinction between theory and practice con- 
stitutes a turning point in Greek astronomy, indeed in science, with regard to the aware- 
ness of possible observational, and for that matter experimental, errors. However, with 
the advent of the Ptolemaic system and its powerful mathematical description, this 
insight of Hipparchus was lost. 
In view of the observational difficulties, Hipparchus, it appears, resolved to find 
limits within which the solar parallax must lie in order to get observation and calculation 
to agree in the case of solar eclipse. In Book 1 of his On Sizes and Distances, Hipparchus 
started from the fact that there is no observable solar parallax. He therefore assumed the 
extreme situation in which the solar parallax was zero; that is, that the sun was, for prac- 
tical purposes, infinitely distant. Using then the data from the eclipse of 14 March 189 
B.C., he derived a minimum distance of the moon (seventy-one earth radii at least dis- 
tance). As G. J. Toomer points out, Hipparchus 
was well aware of the unreliability of his premisses: for first, the fact that no solar parallax 
could be observed did not mean that the parallax was in fact zero; secondly, a small change, to 
five-sixths or three quarters, in the figure for the size of the eclip se at Alexandria, would cause 
an increase or decrease of 20% in the resulting lunar distance. 
Indeed, at the end of Book 1, Hipparchus forewarned the reader that he should not sup- 
pose that the question of the moon's distance had been resolved. He disclosed that further 
investigations would show the moon's distance to be less than what he had just computed 
(notice that what Hipparchus computed was a minimum).38 He thus openly acknow- 
ledged a contradiction in his parallax calculation. In Book 2, Hipparchus assumed that 
the solar parallax was the maximum possible, namely 7'. He thus computed the sun's 
minimum distance and the corresponding maximum distance of the moon. He found the 
latter to be 67 1/3 re in the mean. He then showed that as the sun's distance increased, the 
moon's distance decreased towards a limit of fifty-nine earth radii. He was thus able to 
establish the moon's distance between quite close limits.39 
The problem of finding accurately the distance of the sun and, as a consequence, its 
actual size was altogether beyond the instrumental means of astronomers until the inven- 
tion of the telescope.40 It is thus to the credit of Hipparchus that he attacked the problem 
from, so to speak, both ends; a method which enabled him to establish not mathematical 
but rather physical limits for the value sought. Furthermore, he acknowledged the 
37 G.J.Toomer, 'Hipparchus on the Distances of the Sun and Moon', Archive for History of Exact Sciences 
(1974), 14, p. 139. Pappus notes in his account of Hipparchus' procedure that Hipparchus 'takes the following 
observation: an eclipse of the sun, which in the Hellespontine region was an exact eclipse of the whole sun, such 
that no part of it was visible, but at Alexandria by Egypt approximately four-fifths of the diameter was 
eclipsed'. (Quoted by Toomer, ibid., pp. 126-127.) 
38 Pappus' commentary; quoted by Toomer, ibid., 126-127. 
39 Toomer, op. cit. (37), p. 139. Cf., Neugebauer, op. cit. (16), pp. 109-112, 327-329. 
40 J.L.E. Dreyer, A History of Astronomy from Thales to Kepler, 2nd edn (revised with a Foreword by 
W.H. Stahl), New York, 1953, p. 184. Neugebauer remarks that 'it is not surprising that the early attempts at 
determining the size and distance of sun and moon in relation to the earth ended with wrong results. The 
ancient methods are of necessity based on trigonometric arguments in combination with visual estimates of 
very small angles and one naturally had the tendency to falsify such estimates in the wrong direction.' 
(Neugebauer, op. cit. (16), p. 634.) 
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indefinite nature of his measurements which effectively prevented the solution of the 
problem. This acknowledgement indicates not only an insight into the roles of theory and 
practice, but also a scientific honesty, for Hipparchus did not erase his conflicting 
results. He disclosed that the 'maximum distance' in Book 2, that is, 67 1/3 re, had turned 
out to be smaller than the 'minimum distance' in Book 1, that is, 71re; these values are 
nevertheless of the same order of magnitude, and-for the first time in the history of 
astronomy-in the right region.41 As Toomer remarks, this kind of openness is rare; it 
can also be found in the works of Kepler.42 Kepler, in fact, intended to entitle his planned 
systematic treatise on astronomy-a treatise similar in its comprehensive goal to the 
Syntaxis of Ptolemy-with the name Hipparchus, in honour of this great astronomer.43 
In Toomer's view, Hipparchus' treatise 'is a model of the use of a few observations 
to squeeze out a reliable result, while retaining due distrust of the accuracy of the 
observations'.44 
One source of error in Hipparchus' procedure lies in his a priori assumption of a per- 
ceptible solar parallax, a hypothesis which Ptolemy (A.D. 100-170) considered highly 
questionable.45 'In the case of the sun it is quite uncertain,' Ptolemy maintains, 'not 
merely how great a parallax it has, but whether it has any at all.'46 However, he himself 
did not improve on it, on the contrary, as will be observed, he made a distinctly retro- 
grade step which fixed an incorrect solar parallax for almost 1500 years.47 From the 
point of view of the practice of observation, Neugebauer remarks that 
the exaggerated value of the solar parallax is of little importance [with regard to the theory of 
eclipses and planetary motion] compared, e.g., to the effects of refraction and to errors of 
measurement of times and angles.48 
Nevertheless, with the improvement of observational techniques and the accumulation 
of observational records, one would have expected that the scale of the planetary system 
could have been gradually enlarged. But as it happened, more than a millennium had to 
pass before the determination of the solar parallax was improved. It was Kepler who by 
amassing really refined observations, realized that a reduction to 1/3 of the incorrect 
ancient solar parallax should be introduced.49 
41 Toomer, op. cit. (37), pp. 139-140. Dreyer, ibid. 
42 Toomer, ibid. 
43 However, Kepler did not carry out his plan and wrote instead an elementary text-book of astronomy, 
Epitome Astronomiae Copernicanae. (Dreyer, op. cit. (40), pp. 403.) 
44 Toomer, op. cit. (37), pp. 139-140. 
45 Neugebauer, op. cit. (16), p. 329. 
46 Quoted by Toomer, op. cit. (37), p. 126. 
47 Dreyer, op. cit. (40), pp. 184-185. 
48 Neugebauer, op. cit. (16), p. 111. 
49 Ibid. In Neugebauer's view 'Muslim astronomers ... restricted themselves by and large to the most 
elementary parts of Greek astronomy: refinements in the parameters of the solar motion, and increased accu- 
racy in the determination of the obliquity of the ecliptic and the constant of precession'. (Ibid., p. 145.) How- 
ever, Neugebauer remarks that 'the conceptual elegance of Ptolemy's cinematic models and the logical consis- 
tency of the derivation of the fundamental parameters from carefully selected observations made it extremely 
difficult to introduce more than insignificant modifications of the basic theory'. Thus, Neugebauer continues, 
(every attempt at a revision of the foundations of the planetary theory must have appeared, rightly, as a gigantic 
task, not lightly to be undertaken in view of the consistency of the structure erected in the Almagest'. (Ibid.) For 
Neugebauer 'it is not surprising that a cosmological theory of such impressive internal consistency was not con- 
ducive to serious scrutiny'. (Ibid., p. 919.) 
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However innovative, Hipparchus' treatment of the problem of solar parallax does 
not surpass in its insight his great discovery of the precession of the equinoxes. Babylo- 
nian and early Greek astronomy does not distinguish between the sidereal year (the 
periodic time in which the sun returns to the same position with respect to the fixed stars 
whence it departed) and the tropical year (the time interval that elapses between the sun's 
two successive passages through the same tropic: equinoctial or solstitial point).50 In 
other words, this astronomy presupposes the equivalence and constancy of the time 
intervals which these two distinct ways of describing the periodicity of the sun's motion 
exhibit. Hipparchus' great discovery is the recognition that the sun returns sooner to the 
vernal point than to the same fixed star; that is, Hipparchus discovered that the tropical 
year is shorter than the sidereal year, a discovery which is, in effect, the discovery of the 
precession of the equinoxes.51 
To conceive the possibility of such a distinction requires, first and foremost, a convic- 
tion that, as Neugebauer puts it, 'no periodic time interval should be accepted as exactly 
constant without empirical confirmation through observations distant as far as possible 
from one another'.52 Holding to this methodological principle, Hipparchus scrutinized 
earlier records of fixed star distances with respect to equinoxes and solstices, and data 
concerning the moments of equinoxes and solstices. Such records, about 150-170 years 
old, were available to him, and he compared these observations with his own results.53 
In performing this comparison Hipparchus exhibits not only an awareness of the import- 
ance of accurate observations, but also the ability to carry this understanding into effect; 
that is, to attempt to evaluate the errors in all of these observations and thus to assess the 
validity of the observational results.54 Hipparchus published the results of this attempt 
in the treatise On the Length of the Year, in which he came to the conclusion that 'the 
equinoctial points move at least 10 per century in a direction opposite to the order of the 
zodiacal signs'.S5 
Ptolemy reports that in assessing the validity of the observational results, Hipparchus 
realized that errors could easily account for a shift of up to a quarter of a day.56 Adhering 
to his methodology, Hipparchus did not exclude a priori the possibility of variations in 
the lengths of the years: either sidereal or tropical, or both.57 It was therefore a problem 
for him whether or not these periodic time intervals are constant. 'It is clear ... from these 
50 Ibid., pp. 54, 369, 529, 543 note no. 13, 1082-1083. 
51 Ibid., pp. 807 note no. 15, 1082-1083. 
52 Ibid., p. 54. 
53 Ibid., pp. 292-298. 
54 However, see the criticism of Aaboe and Price, particularly the discussion of the different accuracy 
obtained in solstice and equinox observations. (A. Aaboe and D.J. de Solla Price, 'Qualitative Measurement in 
Antiquity: the derivation of accurate parameters from crude but crucial observations', in A. Koyre, L'aventure 
de la Science, Melanges A. Koyre, Vol. I, Paris, 1964, pp. 6-10. Cf. op. cit. (138). 
55 Neugebauer, op. cit. (16), p. 293, my emphasis. Apparently, this discovery led Hipparchus to introduce 
real ecliptic coordinates because longitudes increase proportionally with time whereas latitudes remain 
unchanged. (Neugebauer, op. cit. (13), p. 69.) 
56 Lloyd, op. cit. (11), p. 181 note no. 295. Lloyd, op. cit. (23), p. 141. Neugebauer, op. cit. (16), p. 294. 
57 Neugebauer, ibid., p. 298. 
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observations,' Hipparchus commented, 
that the differences of the years have been very small. But as regards the solstices I do not 
despair of my and Archimedes' being in error both in observation and in calculation even up 
to the fourth part of a day. But the irregularity of the early periods can be accurately 
apprehended from observations made on the bronze ring set up in Alexandria in the so-called 
Square Hall.58 
Thus, Hipparchus seems to have found that real variations in the length of the tropical 
year must be admitted, notwithstanding his awareness of possible errors of up to six 
hours arising from either observations or calculations, or both.59 
The achievement of Hipparchus lies in his attempt to assess, theoretically as well as 
practically, earlier observations; that is, to determine their reliability and accuracy. In the 
case of the length of the tropical year, Hipparchus was aware of the possibility of explain- 
ing the apparent variations as due to the occurrences of experimental errors. However, 
he concluded that in this case a new phenomenon has to be acknowledged, namely, that 
the tropical year is not constant. This conclusion is incorrect; it was Ptolemy who cor- 
rectly established the constancy of the tropical year.60 Nevertheless, Hipparchus' 
methodology points in the right direction: it does take the problem of experimental error 
into account in however rudimentary and unsuccessful a fashion. Moreover, since he had 
at his disposal only a few observations, neither very old nor very accurate, he formulated 
his results, as Neugebauer puts it, 'very cautiously and in a preliminary form'.61 He, for 
example, questioned the suggestion that the poles of the ecliptic are the centre of the 
motion of the precession, as he could not demonstrate it from the very limited empirical 
material that he had, a suggestion which Ptolemy did not doubt any longer. For Ptolemy 
it was an established fact that the slow motion of precession proceeds about the pole of 
the ecliptic and not about the pole of the equator.62 
Characteristically, Hipparchus was aware that his limited data could not support a 
definite determination of the magnitude of the precession. He thus resolved to set a lower 
limit and considered it to be one degree per century. This judgement was vindicated later 
since Hipparchus reports in his later treatise, On the Displacement of the Solstitial and 
Equinoctial signs, that he 'found Spica to be six degrees from the autumnal equinox, 
while Timocharis had found the distance to be eight degrees'.63 Timocharis had observed 
Spica in 294 and 283 B.C., while Hipparchus observed it in 129 B.C., thus the change 
amounts to 45" or 46" a year, that is, about 1 1/4 degrees per century.64 
58 Quoted by Ptolemy. See Lloyd, op. cit. (23), p. 141. 
59 Hipparchus adduces another proof for variation in the length of the tropical year from calculations 
based on eclipse data. However, Ptolemy criticizes this proof and considers it circular. (Ibid., pp. 142, 156. 
Neugebauer, op. cit. (16), p. 295. See op. cit. (90).) 
60 Neugebauer, ibid. Cf., op. cit. (85, 86). Copernicus also did not realize that errors of observation were 
quite sufficient to account for the difference between the various values of the constant of precession. (Dreyer, 
op. cit. (40), p. 329.) 
61 Neugebauer, ibid., p. 294. 
62 Ibid., pp. 294, note no. 15, 296. See also op. cit. (84). 
63 Dreyer, op. cit. (40), p. 203. 
64 Ibid. 
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Almost two and a half centuries after Hipparchus had introduced the requirements 
for new standards in astronomical studies, Ptolemy succeeded in casting the observations 
and calculations into a so-called system, namely the Ptolemaic system. There is no doubt 
that Ptolemy drew from Hipparchus' works, be they methodological, theoretical or 
observational.65 Indeed, it seems that Hipparchus had anticipated a Ptolemy who would 
put his results to use, for he consciously prepared the ground for further work to be 
carried out on the basis of his systematized observations.66 As Ptolemy writes, it was 
because he 
had not received from his predecessors as many accurate observations as he has left to us, that 
Hipparchus, who loved truth above everything, only investigated the hypotheses of the sun and 
moon, proving that it was possible to account perfectly for their revolutions by combinations 
of circular and uniform motions, while for the five planets . . . he has not even commenced the 
theory, and has contented himself with collecting systematically the observations and showing 
that they did not agree with the hypotheses of the mathematicians of his time.67 
The greatest achievement of Hipparchus was not the prediction of future eclipses for 
600 years, as Pliny-apparently following a certain tradition-would have us believe, 
but rather the arrangement and classification of the material at his disposal from the past 
600 years.68 Hipparchus laid a solid foundation for the development of theoretical 
astronomy and made it possible for Ptolemy to take full advantage of the accumulated 
observational results.69 Indeed, without the work of Hipparchus 'one could never have 
hoped to predict eclipses with reasonable accuracy and to test the foundations of theo- 
retical astronomy'.70 According to Neugebauer, Hipparchus was 'fully conscious of the 
fact that many of the parameters as well as the theoretical models at his disposal were 
only approximations in need of refinement by future generations'.71 
The fact that Hipparchus sought to establish a sound and solid foundation for 
astronomy by providing observations and arranging them for proper analysis by future 
generations,72 did not escape the perceptive eye of Kepler. Kepler drew the attention of 
Maestlin, his teacher, to the following parallel: 
You can see in what manner God disposes of his gifts; one man cannot do everything. Tycho 
Brahe has done what Hipparchus did; he has laid the foundations of the edifice, and has 
accomplished an enormous amount of work. Hipparchus had need of a Ptolemy who built 
thereon [the theories] of the five planets. I have done as much whilst he [Tycho Brahe] was still 
alive.73 
65 E.g., Neugebauer, op. cit. (16), p. 89. 
66 Dreyer, op. cit. (40), pp. 161, 166-167. 
67 Quoted by Dreyer, ibid., pp. 165-166. 
68 See Neugebauer, op. cit. (16), pp. 319-321. 
69 In his 'Notes on Hipparchus', Neugebauer concludes that 'it is our good luck to be able to see in the 
Almagest how Ptolemy utilized this material with supreme skill'. (Neugebauer, op. cit. (14), p. 296.) 
70 Neugebauer, op. cit. (16), p. 321. 
71 Ibid., p. 320. 
72 Neugebauer, op. cit. (14), p. 296. 
73 Quoted by Koyre, op. cit. (1), p. 398, note no. 4. Neugebauer puts it this way: 'One may perhaps say 
that the role of Apollonius, Hipparchus, and Ptolemy has a parallel in the positions of Copernicus, Brahe and 
Kepler.' (Neugebauer, op. cit. (16), p. 309.) 
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Ptolemy, however, had not consolidated the methodological and observational 
achievements of Hipparchus, as much as Kepler did vis-a-vis Tycho Brahe's. Unlike 
Hipparchus, Ptolemy neither acknowledged the limitations of his results nor did he 
examine them critically; he did not pursue his studies along an open path but rather saw 
to it that his system would account for the phenomena. Ptolemy did not make explicit the 
criteria upon which he judged some observations more accurate and reliable than others. 
He thereby exposed his methodology, as Lloyd points out, to the charge of circularity: 
'the observations are judged accurate because they confirm the theories (Hipparchus' or 
his own) and the theories are accepted on the grounds that the "best" observations 
confirmed them'.74 
Ptolemy, like Hipparchus, determined the lunar distance as fifty-nine earth radii; but 
unlike Hipparchus he rendered it exact.75 Admittedly, this value is in the right region as 
the accepted value is 60 1/3 re; however, it appears that Ptolemy's result is approximately 
right only because a series of errors in observation and theory cancelled each other.76 
Endorsing this view, Neugebauer holds that in general 'it is only the accidental inter- 
play of a great number of different inaccuracies of empirical data and of computations 
that lead to nearly correct results'.77 But was it accidental? In view of the fact that 
Ptolemy knew in advance at what value of the lunar distance he should arrive, namely, 
Hipparchus' result, it seems incredible that this happened fortuitously. In other words, 
it is not unlikely that Ptolemy selected those observations which he had thought he 
could manipulate to produce exactly Hipparchus' result and thereby render his own 
result exact.78 
This kind of circular procedure, in which results are adjusted to tally with the theory, 
is not unheard-of in classical time. In acoustics, for example, results of real or purported 
experiments are invariably presented, as Lloyd puts it, 
in the form of ratios that exactly correspond to what acoustic theory demanded-and they do 
so even when the tests referred to could not conceivably have yielded anything like those 
results.79 
Indeed, Ptolemy himself perfected, so to speak, this circular method of research in his 
investigation of the phenomenon of refraction which has a great bearing upon the accu- 
racy of astronomical observations. In his Optics, Ptolemy describes detailed experiments 
which are designed to determine the refraction that occurs when light passes from air to 
water, from air to glass and from water to glass. The results are set in tables and although 
some of the results are qualified as 'very nearly', they all tally exactly with a general law 
74 Lloyd, op. cit. (23), p. 158. 
75 Toomer, op. cit. (37), p. 131. 
76 Ibid., p. 131, note no. 25. 
77 Neugebauer, op. cit. (16), p. 106. 
78 Toomer, op. cit. (37), p. 131. Lloyd suggests that Ptolemy settled on a one-value parameter, instead of 
a bounded one in order to simplify the computations. (Lloyd, op. cit. (23), p. 155.) Cf., op. cit. (115). 
79 Lloyd, op. cit. (23), p. 151, emphasis in the original. However, Lloyd points out that 'in acoustics, as 
in astronomy, it was sometimes recognised that different observers will get different results'. (Ibid., p. 132, note 
no. 8.) Indeed, when Plato discusses harmonics in the Republic, he remarks that 'some say they can distinguish 
a note between two others, which gives them a minimum unit of measurement, while others maintain that 
there's no difference between the notes in question'. (Plato, op. cit. (2), p. 340 (530).) 
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which, however, is not stated. To be sure, the law is not correct and it appears that here, 
as Lloyd puts it, 'the observations have been interpreted before they are recorded'.80 
It now becomes clear why Ptolemy determined the solar parallax and distance so 
confidently. For having arrived at what he thought to be the exact lunar distance and thus 
parallax, he proceeded to calculate the solar parameters and assigned confidently to the 
parallax the value 2'5 1". He thereby ignored the cautious methodology of Hipparchus 
and established an incorrect value, about nineteen times too great, which conforms to his 
world picture of nested planetary orbits: a geocentric model that lasted for almost 1500 
years.81 
Another example is concerned with the determination of the magnitude of the pre- 
cession of the equinoxes whose discovery is due, it may be recalled, to Hipparchus. This 
case bears all the traits of the previous one: whereas Hipparchus had determined the pre- 
cession to be at least one degree per century, Ptolemy concluded that it is very nearly one 
degree and he adopted this convenient round number for ordinary working purposes.82 
Hipparchus is not only methodologically correct; in view of the accepted value (about 
1.4 degrees), he is also factually correct. Ptolemy's value for the precession produces a 
deviation of more than one degree in three centuries and thus a noticeable discrepancy 
would have resulted comparatively soon, if only there had been a careful observer to look 
for it.83 
To the credit of Ptolemy it should be noted that he realized that at his disposal were 
sufficient observations for demonstrating that the slow motion of precession proceeds 
about the pole of the ecliptic and not about the pole of the equator.84 Furthermore, he 
held that the observations did not confirm fluctuations in the length of the tropical year; 
he thus considered the amount of precession constant. He argued that 
we are sure by the continuous instrumental observations we have made of tropics and 
equinoxes that these periods [the time between successive tropics or equinoxes] are not 
unequal. For we find them differing by no appreciable amount from the additional quarter day, 
but at times by about as much as could be attributed to the error due to the construction or 
position of the instruments.85 
In Ptolemy's view a deviation of six minutes of arc from the equatorial plane in the 
position of the instrument, generates an error of six hours in the determination of the 
time of the equinox. Ptolemy in fact considered unreliable the instrument at Alexandria 
to which Hipparchus had referred.86 
80 Lloyd, op. cit. (23), p. 151, emphasis in the original. Cf., Lloyd, op. cit. (11), p.197; Neugebauer, op. 
cit. (16), pp. 892-896; Palter, op. cit. (14), pp. 121-122; A.M. Smith, 'Ptolemy's Search for a Law of Refrac- 
tion: A Case-study in the Classical Methodology of "Saving the Appearances" and its Limitations', Archive for 
History of Exact Sciences (1982), 26 no. 3, pp. 221-240. 
81 Neugebauer, op. cit. (16), pp. 112, 634, 917-922. 
82 Ptolemy, Almagest, (trs. and ann. G.J. Toomer), London, 1984, Bk. VII, Ch. 2. Toomer, op. cit. (37), 
p. 13 1 note no. 25. Cf., Dreyer, op. cit. (40), p. 203; Neugebauer, op. cit. (1 6), pp. 54, 160; Lloyd, op. cit. (23), 
pp.147-149. 
83 0. Pedersen, A Survey of the Almagest, Odense, 1974, p. 248. Neugebauer, ibid., pp. 986, 1037. 
84 Neugebauer, ibid., p. 34. 
85 Quoted by Palter, op. cit. (14), pp. 122-123. 
86 Lloyd, op. cit. (11), p. 181 note no. 295; Lloyd, op. cit. (23), pp. 140-142, 145. See op. cit. (58, 59). 
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Although Ptolemy concluded that there is no variation in the tropical year, he 
admitted that its actual length of time is difficult to determine and he emphasized what 
Hipparchus had already realized, namely that to determine accurately periods of return 
it is necessary to use as far as possible observations which are distant in time one from the 
other.87 'The period of return will be obtained as nearly exactly as possible', Ptolemy 
rightly maintains, 'the longer the time between the observations compared.'88 Moreover, 
as Lloyd points out, Ptolemy occasionally stated the need to base conclusions on as many 
observations as possible.89 And since he realized that alternative methods may be used to 
obtain the same result (in the case of the determination of the length of the tropical year, 
Ptolemy cited both direct observations of solstices and equinoxes and results arrived at 
indirectly by calculations based on eclipse data),90 he recommended their use to provide 
a checking procedure; a very powerful method indeed which Kepler also used.91 
Though Ptolemy has emerged as the creator of a dogmatic astronomy much enhanced 
by his mathematical genius, it is none the less true that, like Archimedes, he was also 
interested in problems of observation. Prominent amongst them in astronomy is the 
assignment of limits for permissible discrepancy between observation and calculation. It 
appears that for Ptolemy the limits of tolerance of discrepancy between observation and 
calculation are 10' of arc.92 Although this important consideration is only implied, it 
does indicate that there is after all a methodological difference between his optical and 
astronomical works. As Lloyd explains, 
unlike the Optics, the Syntaxis does not, as a whole, present results that have already been 
tailored to match the theory precisely. The problem there is not that discrepant observational 
data are corrected, in a bid to obtain perfect fit with the theories, but rather that they are tole- 
rated-along with a very broad tolerance of other sources of imprecision in the purely 
mathematical part of the calculations.93 
Another case in point is Ptolemy's clear grasp of the impossibility of establishing 
accurately absolute-as distinct from relative-planetary distances. Ptolemy explicitly 
states that the problem of planetary distances could only be solved if direct measurements 
87 Lloyd, op. cit. (23), pp. 142, 146-147. 
88 Quoted by Lloyd, ibid., p. 142. 
89 Ibid., p. 145. However, as Lloyd stresses, it is not in dispute that the paucity of the actual observations 
cited in Ptolemy's detailed accounts of the movements of the planets in Books IX to XI is remarkable. For each 
planet he cites almost the minimum number of observations that are necessary to determine the parameters of 
what is after all a complex model. (Lloyd, op. cit. (11), p. 186.) Ptolemy is in general quite confident that his 
theories work well; indeed, he considers approximate or uncorrected figures adequate for the exposition of his 
model. (Ibid., p. 187 note no. 325.) 
90 However, Ptolemy criticized Hipparchus' indirect method of determining the length of the tropical year 
using the data of lunar eclipses. He argued that these calculations presuppose correct determinations of 
equinoctial points, and cannot be carried out independently of assumptions about the sun's position. Ptolemy 
thus exposed the circularity of this method. (Lloyd, op. cit. (23), pp. 142, 156. Neugebauer, op. cit. (16), 
p. 295.) 
91 Lloyd, ibid., p. 145. Cf. Hon, op. cit. (1), pp. 557-559. 
92 Dreyer, op. cit. (40), p. 195; Neugebauer, op. cit. (16), p. 99; Palter, op. cit. (14), p. 126; Toomer, op. 
cit. (37), p. 129. However, Lloyd points out that Ptolemy does not always set out his workings in such a way 
that one can see precisely what margin of error he allowed himself. (Lloyd, op. cit. (23), p. 149.) 
93 Lloyd, ibid., p. 152. 
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of all the various parallaxes were available.94 However, such measurements were at 
Ptolemy's time impossible, and thus as far as Ptolemy was concerned this problem should 
have remained unsolved.95 Notwithstanding this recognition, Ptolemy thought it fit to 
construct on the basis of his evaluation of the solar distance-which needless to say is 
erroneous due to incorrect solar parallax obtained indirectly-a planetary shell structure 
that came to prevail till the advent of the Copernican system. It is worth noting that the 
description of the apparent planetary motions, as projected onto the celestial sphere, 
does not require absolute distances. But Ptolemy, it appears, could not resist the tempta- 
tion of solving the very problem he himself had suspended; that is, the determinations of 
absolute planetary distances.96 
Ptolemy in fact showed that he could be quite critical with regard to practical pro- 
cedures and the validity of their results. To measure, for example, the apparent diameter 
of the sun and the moon, one would employ an instrument of the dioptra type. Aristar- 
chus and, later on, Archimedes had arrived by such a method at one 720th part of the cir- 
cumference of the zodiac circle and half a degree respectively; in Ptolemy's time this was 
generally accepted as the correct value. Yet, as Neugebauer reports, it became fashion- 
able to embellish this direct measurement with the timing of the rising of the solar disc 
by means of a water-clock. The claim was that the resultant quantity of water was one 
720th of the total daily outflow. To obtain such a result one has to guarantee an accuracy 
of 1/1000 in the measurement of the daily outflow; a requirement which was then all but 
impossible. Ptolemy was aware of this folly and exposed its fictitiousness.97 
But the most convincing evidence for Ptolemy's interest in practical, in addition to 
theoretical, problems comes from his study of optics. Ptolemy did not confine himself to 
the area of strictly geometrical optics. With his experiments on binocular vision,98 on the 
origin of colour sensation (e.g., the mixture of colours on rotating discs),99 on the refrac- 
tion of light100 and on optical illusions (such as the apparent magnification of celestial 
objects near the horizon),101 Ptolemy went far into the field of physiology of sight and 
optics at large. 
In his studies of astronomy and optics, Ptolemy exhibits a great power of analysis and 
practical inventiveness which rightly makes him one of the greatest figures in the history 
of science. However, the available historical material does not furnish enough evidence 
to reach confident conclusions concerning some aspects of his procedures.102 In his 
94 Neugebauer, op. cit. (16), p. 148. 
95 Neugebauer, op. cit. (13), pp. 155-156. 
96 Neugebauer, op. cit. (16), pp. 148, 917-922, 1088; Lloyd, op. cit. (11), p. 199. Cf. Hon, op. cit. (1), 
pp. 562-563. 
97 Neugebauer, ibid., pp. 103, 657-658. Ptolemy in fact adduces an array of arguments against this 
method: (1) the hole of the clepsydra gets stopped up; (2) the quantity of water that flows out in a night or a 
day is not necessarily an exact multiple of the quantity taken at the rising; (3) it is inexact to take the chord as 
equal to the arc it subtends. (Lloyd, op. cit. (23), p. 143.) 
98 Neugebauer, op. cit. (16), pp. 893-894. 
99 Ibid., p. 894. 
100 Op. cit. (80), and (137); but see (139). 
101 Neugebauer, op. cit. (16), p. 894; op. cit. (136). Ptolemy lists in the Optics many illusory phenomena 
and he attempts to account for them. Far from concluding that sight is deceptive, he stresses the difference 
between exceptional and normal sight. (Lloyd, op. cit. (23), p. 161.) 
102 Lloyd, ibid., p. 147. 
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astronomical studies Ptolemy had presumably some other data besides those he quotes, 
but one remains totally in the dark as to his selective criteria.103 Lloyd maintains that it 
is largely a matter of guesswork to determine 'how far he is prepared to adjust his data 
or to ignore conflicting evidence: how far he systematically biases what he records in 
favour of preconceived conclusions'.104 Yet, from the Syntaxis itself, it is abundantly 
clear, as Lloyd observes, 'that he does not submit his results to rigorous and extensive 
controls'.105 In Lloyd's view, 'there can be little doubt that as a whole he sought to 
confirm earlier results as far as possible, particularly those of Hipparchus'.106 By giving 
the minimum number of observations required to determine the parameters and by mak- 
ing adjustments uch as discounting minor discrepancies in the reported observational 
data and roundings in the calculations, Ptolemy weakens the 'confrontation' between 
theory and empirical results. It is not therefore reassuring that he professes to select the 
more accurate observations of those recorded by his predecessors, as these are the obser- 
vations which tend to corroborate his theory.107 But at the same time, he was prepared, 
as Lloyd continues to observe, 'to modify the current heory at certain points-to obtain 
a better fit with such evidence as he had at his disposal'.108 Lloyd, however, concludes 
that the deductive nature of the Syntaxis cannot be disputed: 'it is an exercise in geomet- 
rical demonstration and that is where its great strength lies'.109 
The few cases I have outlined show that in Greek astronomy one can find evidence of 
some significant concern with the problem of obtaining accurate observational data, 
though these evidences occur, so to speak, late in the day."0 Ptolemy was in fact 
explicitly critical of most ancient observations from which he had to draw on for his 
planetary theories; in his view they had been recorded 'inattentively and at the same time 
in a rough and ready fashion'."' Indeed, he, and Hipparchus before him, were aware of 
particular sources of error in observations and calculations.1"2 However, as R. Palter 
103 Ibid., p. 150. 
104 Lloyd, op. cit. (11), p. 198. 
105 Ibid. 
106 Ibid., emphasis on the original. 
107 Ibid., p. 192; Lloyd, op. cit. (23), pp. 147, 157. 
108 Lloyd, op. cit. (11), p. 198. In his account of Venus, Ptolemy claims that the observational data 
required the introduction of the equant: the 'centre for the eccenter which produces the uniform motion', to use 
Ptolemy's own definition. (Ibid., p. 192; Neugebauer, op. cit. (16), p. 1102.) In Neugebauer's view, the intro- 
duction of the equant was an 'important step in the history of the theory of planetary motion . . ., a step which 
was eliminated by philosophical reasons in Copernicus' theory but again fully recognized in its importance by 
Kepler'. (Neugebauer, ibid., p. 171; cf., Hon, op. cit. (1), p. 559.) 
109 Lloyd, ibid., p. 198. 
110 The existence of a Greek star-catalogue of over 1000 stars which gives longitude, latitude and mag- 
nitude determinations for each star, is considered another evidence-regardless of the controversy concerning 
its origin-of sustained observational work. (Ibid., pp. 183-184, 200; Dreyer, op. cit. (40), pp. 202-203; 
Neugebauer, op. cit. (13), pp. 68-69; Neugebauer, op. cit. (16), pp. 53-54,280-292,577, 836, 1087; Palter, 
op. cit. (14), p. 126.) 
111 Quoted by Lloyd, op. cit. (23), p. 133. 
112 Ibid., pp. 156-157; Lloyd, op. cit. (11), p. 182. 
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remarks, 
repetition of experiments, cross-checks of experimental findings, rigid control over measure- 
ment procedures, scrupulous reporting of all measurements: these must have been exceptional, 
if they occurred at all, in ancient astronomy.113 
Lloyd concurs with this view in concluding that although it is not doubtful that Ptolemy 
realized the importance of obtaining trustworthy data, parts of the Syntaxis show, 
nevertheless, 
little awareness of the need for the rigorous and repeated checking and control of results against 
accumulated evidence-or of the need for the meticulous recording and presentation of that 
evidence. 114 
To be sure, here one has to guard against the historical mistake of passing a negative 
judgement on the standard of ancient observations in the light of the requirements of 
modern procedures; there is however significant evidence of retrograde steps e.g. an 
abandonment of the proper methods available and a disregard for glaring discrepancies. 
One such proper method which is very suitable for handling inaccurate data, namely 
the bracketing of a measurement result between upper and lower bounds, was never put 
to extensive use in Greek astronomy. This method which had originated in Greek 
mathematics and gained a proper physical basis in the work of Hipparchus, apparently 
lost its appeal once a planetary system became available. Lloyd suggests that a reason for 
this step is that the use of this method would have resulted in such complex computations 
that they would have become quite unmanageable.115 It is indeed easier to operate with 
a parameter to which one value has been assigned rather than a dual one. However, it is 
one thing to consider such one-value parameter a tentative quantity for working pur- 
poses, and quite another to regard it as representing 'very nearly' the true value. 
The lunar theory which had originated in Hipparchus' work and was later developed 
by Ptolemy, demands excessive variations in the moon's geocentric distance, and thereby 
in its apparent diameter.116 However, this expected phenomenon never occurs in reality, 
and as J. L. E. Dreyer maintains, 'it cannot possibly have escaped Hipparchus and 
Ptolemy';117 yet, they took no notice of it.118 This lack of consideration for a glaring dis- 
crepancy between the observed phenomenon and the result of a theory, shows that 
Hipparchus and Ptolemy 'did not look upon their work as a real system of the world, but 
113 Palter, op. cit. (14), p. 122. 
114 Lloyd, op. cit. (1 1), p.;200. 
115 Lloyd, op. cit. (23), p. 155. Lloyd thus holds that the deductive articulation of Ptolemy's theories has 
effectively ruled out in most cases the use of upper and lower limits for the main fundamental parameters. 
(Ibid., p. 156.) Neugebauer on his part observes that Ptolemy 'resorted to mere approximations when higher 
accuracy implied too heavy a burden of numerical computations'. (Neugebauer, op. cit. (16), p. 145.) 
116 The epicycle-eccentric model of Hipparchus and Ptolemy for the sun and moon has been hailed as 'the 
outstanding example, from the ancient world, of a theory that combined the mathematical rigour the Greek 
scientists demanded with a detailed empirical base'. (Lloyd, op. cit. (11), p. 200.) 
117 Dreyer, op. cit. (40), p. 201. Ptolemy indeed records his awareness of this discrepancy. (Lloyd, op. cit. 
(23), p. 139.) 
118 Dreyer, ibid., p. 196. 
Concept of Experimental Error in Greek Astronomy 147 
merely as an aid to computation'."19 Dreyer argues that Ptolemy's epicyclic theory 'was 
merely a means of calculating the apparent places of the planets without pretending to 
represent he true system of the world, and it certainly fulfilled its object satisfactorily, 
and, from a mathematical point of view, in a very elegant manner'.120 Indeed, Ptolemy 
generally begins the theory of a particular aspect of a planet's motion by saying 'let us 
imagine ... a circle'.'12 Even in the Planetary Hypotheses-Ptolemy's other astronomical 
treatise in which he attempted to establish a true physical account of planetary 
motions122 -Ptolemy admits in the introduction that 'I do not profess to be able thus to 
account for all the motions at the same time; but I shall show that each by itself is well 
explained in its proper hypothesis'.123 This admission of Ptolemy strengthens the view 
that Ptolemy's system is not really a system, let alone a physical system, but rather a string 
of mathematical hypotheses.124 
It seems safe to conclude that in Greek astronomy the context in which observational 
results were incorporated into theories is not that of testing but rather corroborating. In 
their paper which bears the significant itle, 'Qualitative Measurement in Antiquity', A. 
Aaboe and D. J. de Solla Price arrive at the conclusion that 
the role of instruments in antiquity was to serve convenience rather than precision, and that the 
characteristic type of measurement depended not on instrumental perfection but on the correct 
choice of crucial phenomena. If such phenomena could be welded together in a matrix of 
mathematics, the agreement between observation and theory was perfect. Needless to say, if 
one phenomenon did not fit, it had to be rejected as inaccurate and imperfect.125 
119 Ibid., p.201. The phenomenon of annular solar eclipse is another case in point. Since Ptolemy assumed 
that the apparent lunar diameter equals the apparent solar diameter when the moon is at its maximum geo- 
centric distance (previous astronomers had assumed equality for the moon at mean distance), he in effect denied 
the possibility of annular solar eclipse. However, in all probability such a phenomenon was observed still in his 
lifetime. But, as Neugebauer remarks, 'neither then nor during the next 1400 years was the obviously necessary 
modification ... undertaken'. (Neugebauer, op. cit. (16), pp. 104, 111.) Kepler studied carefully reports of such 
an eclipse and considered them correct. (Hon, op. cit. (1), p. 579.) In general, Kepler did not rest until he was 
able to reconcile all aspects of theory and observations, whereas Ptolemy's theory had been accepted for cen- 
turies without any attempt to eliminate its defects. (Neugebauer, op. cit. (16), p. 98.) 'I have built up a theory 
of Mars', Kepler writes to his teacher, Maestlin, 'such that there is no difficulty about agreement between cal- 
culation and the accuracy of observational data'. (Quoted by Koyre, op. cit. (1), p. 397 note no. 4.) 
120 Dreyer, ibid., p. 196. 
121 Ibid., p. 201. 
122 On the Planetary Hypotheses see Pedersen, op. cit. (83), pp. 391ff; Lloyd, op. cit. (11), p. 199; 
Neugebauer, op. cit. (16), pp. 900ff. 
123 Quoted by Dreyer, op. cit. (40), p. 196. 
124 Lloyd disagrees with this interpretation. In his view, Ptolemy's work 'is not simply and solely a piece 
of pure mathematics'. (Lloyd, op. cit. (1 1), p. 198, my emphasis.) According to Lloyd, Ptolemy 'hoped for a true 
physical account, indeed one that covered not just the kinematics, but also the dynamics, of heavenly move- 
ment'. (Lloyd, ibid., p. 199.) However, in Neugebauer's view, the Planetary Hypotheses seems on the face of 
it to suggest some mechanism which connects the motions of the planets within a larger cosmic system, but in 
fact nothing of this kind is achieved. 'No planet is influenced by the motion of any other one and the only unify- 
ing principle is their confinement into contiguous but strictly separated compartments .. .' (Neugebauer, op. 
cit. (16), p. 922.) 
125 Aaboe and Price, op. cit. (54), pp. 3-4. 
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Thus, when Neugebauer writes that 'the ancient astronomers rightly had greater con- 
fidence in the accuracy of their mathematical theory than in their instruments',126 he 
appears to be giving these astronomers undue credit as this judgement implies that they 
fully appreciated problems of observation-particularly the limitations of their instru- 
ments-and the interplay that exists between mathematical theories and observations. 
As Aaboe and Price show, the accuracy which ancient astronomers ometimes present 
through complicated numbers is in fact an illusion; this illusion of accuracy is the result 
of crude numerical data having been fed into the mathematical machinery.'27 'Far from 
any march towards precision by way of instrumental improvement in antiquity, we find,' 
write Aaboe and Price, 'but a predominant concern with the mathematical niceties of 
such theory'.128 
In sum, elaboration of theory, particularly its mathematical basis and geometrical 
constructs, constituted the central concern of the Greek astronomers. However, this 
preoccupation with theory at the expense of observation should not be construed as sig- 
nifying an insight into the limitations of the available observational techniques. Rather, 
it is an indication that observations played a secondary role: they were used mainly as 
illustrations, not as a means of testing. 
In view of this analysis of Greek astronomy, my principal argument may be formu- 
lated thus: in a science where empirical results are more often used for the purpose of 
illustrating and supporting theories rather than testing them,129 one would not expect a 
clear grasp of the concept of experimental error. To be sure, one cannot really deny that 
the Greek astronomers had some implicit notion of the problem of experimental error. 
However, this implicit notion did not develop into explicit methodological procedures 
intended to be applied rigorously to account for the occurrence of experimental errors. 
Rather, this notion remained stagnant, if it did not regress. Again, in an astronomy where 
the observations, as Lloyd puts it, 'are cited to illustrate and support particular doc- 
trines'; where 'the observations are sometimes already interpreted in the light of the 
theories they were meant to establish', and where the support is in many cases exag- 
gerated: 30 in such an astronomy there is no room for a developed concept of experiment- 
al error. This concept can emerge only in a context where the empirical results are given 
their due weight as a means of testing theories, and the theories are construed as reflecting 
real physical relations and not mere mathematical relations between abstract entities. 
I have argued elsewhere that in Kepler one can find a combination of ideas which was 
conducive to this proper understanding of empirical results and the role experimental 
errors play in their evaluation. This understanding, I have argued, emerged not only from 
126 Neugebauer, op. cit. (13), p. 185. Elsewhere Neugebauer writes that 'it makes no sense to praise or to 
condemn the ancients for the accuracy or for the errors in their numerical results. What is really admirable in 
ancient astronomy is its theoretical structure, erected in spite of the enormous difficulties that beset the attempts 
to obtain reliable empirical data'. (Neugebauer, op. cit. (16), p. 108.) 
127 Aaboe and Price go on to say that 'the simple numbers however produce results that agree remarkably 
well with the facts, so that we must marvel at the way in which the choice and simple numbers were injected 
into suitably interlocking chains'. (Aaboe and Price, op. cit. (54), p. 20.) 
128 Ibid. 
129 Lloyd, op. cit. (11), p. 200. 
130 Ibid., p. 221. 
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the pioneering work of Tycho Brahe who had heralded the modern method of observa- 
tion-the continuous observation to the point of overdetermining the phenomenon 131 
but also from the genius of Kepler in which the idea of unity was combined with the belief 
in physical realism.132 
By way of conclusion, I should like to extend a distinction which Lloyd has drawn to 
facilitate the discussion on errors of observation. In his paper on observational error in 
later Greek science, Lloyd distinguishes between 'problems that arise from the conditions 
under which the object is to be observed or from the nature of the object itself, and those 
that relate to the means or method of observation'.133 Lloyd is aware that the distinction 
is broad and cannot always hold firmly.134 
Under the first category, that is the category of conditions of observation, Lloyd 
includes any type of interference arising from atmospheric conditions.135 Ptolemy, for 
example, suggests that 
the same angular distances appear greater to the eye near the horizon, and less near the zenith, 
and so for this reason it is clear that they can be measured sometimes as greater and sometimes 
as less than the real angular distance.136 
However, it is worth noting that although Ptolemy recognized and indeed studied the 
phenomenon of refraction, he does not make any systematic correction to accommodate 
this hindrance.137 As an example for problems which arise in the conditions created by 
the object itself, Lloyd suggests the case of determining solstices and equinoxes. At a 
solstitial point, the sun is either at its maximum or minimum declination. Two days away 
from a solstitial point, the sun's declination differs but 1' from the extreme value; and 
after five days the declination changes by as little as 6'. By contrast, the declination of the 
sun changes at an equinox by about 24' per day. Thus, whereas an equinoctial point can 
be determined to an accuracy of 1/4 day (allowing for an inaccuracy of 6'), a solstitial 
point cannot be located directly to an accuracy better than some three or four days.138 
Ptolemy was aware of this difference and indeed remarks on the greater accuracy of 
equinox observations.139 
The second category of Lloyd's classification of observational errors consists of prob- 
lems which arise in the means and method by which the phenomenon is observed. Here 
Lloyd includes the use of sighting aids or other instruments.140 The experiments of 
Archimedes on the dioptra, as reported in the Sand-Reckoner, constitute such a case. 
131 Aaboe and Price, op. cit. (54), p. 16; Neugebauer, op. cit. (16), p. 1089. 
132 Hon, op. cit. (1). Cf., N. Jardine, The Birth of History and Philosophy of Science: Kepler's A Defence 
of Tycho against Ursus with essays on its provenance and significance, Cambridge, 1984. 
133 Lloyd, op. cit. (23), p. 133. 
134 Ibid., pp. 133-134. 
135 Ibid., pp. 134-135. 
136 Quoted by Lloyd, ibid., p. 135; cf. ibid., note 12. 
137 Ibid., p. 134. However, as Neugebauer remarks, 'it should be remembered how difficult the problem 
still appeared to Brahe and Kepler when it was taken up around 1600'. (Neugebauer, op. cit. (16), p. 896.) 
138 Aaboe and Price, op. cit. (54), p. 9. 
139 Lloyd, op. cit. (23), p. 135. 
140 Ibid., pp. 136ff. 
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Another example is Ptolemy's rejection of the unsound attempt to establish the apparent 
diameter of the sun or moon by means of the water-clock."14 
This broad classification which Lloyd introduces, constitutes a preliminary step 
towards a general taxonomy of types of experimental error. Although the distinction 
Lloyd draws applies only for observational errors, the motivation is the same: to clarify 
the problem of experimental error, one may classify different ypes of errors which arise 
in different contexts; or, to use Wittgenstein's expression, 'mustn't one make a distinc- 
tion between the ways in which something "turns out wrong"?"42 Lloyd classifies, as we 
have seen, two types of observational errors: those that are associated with either the 
external or internal conditions of the observed object, and those that pertain to a particu- 
lar method of observation. In the light of my discussion on Kepler's awareness of the 
problem of experimental error, it becomes apparent hat a general and yet refined classifi- 
cation more than the one Lloyd applies to Greek astronomy-is needed in order to 
truly reflect Kepler's novel understanding of the problem of experimental error. Such a 
classification will have to take into consideration not only errors that pertain to observa- 
tion, but also errors that may arise in the theoretical background-especially in the 
underlying assumptions and the theory of the apparatus-the actual employment of the 
apparatus as well as the reduction of the recorded data and their interpretation."4' 
141 Op. cit. (28, 30, 97). 
142 L. Wittgenstein, On Certainty, (eds G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright, trs D. Paul and G. E. 
M. Anscombe), Oxford, 1977, p. 84e (#641). 
143 Hon. op. cit. (1), p. 591. Cf., G. Hon, 'On the Concept of Experimental Error', Ph.D. Thesis, London 
University, (1985), Ch. IV: A Classification of Types of Experimental Error; G. Hon, 'Towards a Typology of 
Experimental Errors: an Epistemological View', Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 20. 
